# The effects of a boarding school for disadvantaged students on students' secondary and tertiary education. 

Luc Behaghel Clément de Chaisemartin Marc Gurgand PSE<br>Sciences Po<br>PSE

19 octobre 2023

## Background and research question

## Low social mobility in France

■ Kenedi and Sirugue (2022) : father-son wage rank-rank correlation $=0.34$, very close to US, way above Scandinavia, Canada, Italy, or Australia.
■ Bonneau and Grobon (2021) : very large socio-economic gradient in access to HE, comparable to US.

- Surprising : universities are entirely free in France, very expensive in the US.


## Low perceived returns to work, and protest culture

- French people aware of low mobility.
- 2006 World Values Survey : French people do not believe that "hard work brings success" (country with 5th lowest score, gafter Poland, Rwanda, Russia, and Serbia).
- May in turn explain France's famous protest culture : country where share of pop that already participated in a demonstration is the largest.
- In particular, violent riots where youth confronts police sporadically emerge in suburbs of large French cities, where youth unemployment high and economic opportunities low.


## 2005 riots : failure of French integration model ?

- In the wake of deaths of two young people trying to escape police, important riots in suburbs of large French cities in fall of 2005 .
- Many rioters had immigrant background, with family origins in the Maghreb and Subsaharan Africa (Mucchielli \& Le Goaziou 2013).
- Thus, events were perceived by French political class as failure of the French integration model.


## Policy responses

- Conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy tasked Fadela Amara, Secretary of State for Urban Policies, with designing the "Espoir Banlieues" (Hope for the Suburbs) plan.
■ Plan formally announced by president Sarkozy in a speech on February 8th 2008.
■ With numerous references to immigration and diversity, speech $=$ call to end the ethnic discriminations that are pervasive in French society, and improve the opportunities of "responsible" youth with immigrant background.
- One of the concrete announcements: creation of "Internats d'excellence".


## Internats d'excellence programme

■ Internats d'excellence : boarding schools for middle and high school students.

- Importantly, schools cannot explicitly target students based on their ethnicity or their country of origin : such targeting would be illegal in France.
■ Instead: "deserving" students from "quartiers politiques de la ville" (priority neighborhoods).
- Better studying conditions and substitute school to home environment.
- Intensive compensatory intervention: add. cost/student=10k euros/year.


## Long-term effects of Sourdun, programme flagship

■ Behaghel et al. (2017) : Sourdun, program flagship, increases boarders' maths test scores two years after admission.

- Relatively modest effect in view of program cost : $0.28 \sigma /$ year.

■ Does Sourdun have long-term effects on students' secondary and tertiary education? If so, for which students?

Context, Design, Population, and Data

## Relatively good students, from modest and diverse families

- Applicants' academic ability :
- good students relative to their classmates.
- median students relative to French distribution.
- From modest families :
- almost $50 \%$ have parents unemployed, blue collar, or employee
- More than $40 \%$ benefit from means tested grant
- Parents twice more unemployed as that of their classmates.

■ French only language spoken at home for only $40 \%$ of them. Thereafter : proxy for "minority/majority" students.

A former military building, in the middle of the fields...


## Smaller classes, better classroom environment...

■ Class size : 20 students versus 26 for controls.

- Teachers more qualified but less experienced.

■ Less classroom disruption : on a measure of classroom disruption self-reported by students (e.g. : there is noise and disruption in my classroom), T-C=-0.7 sd.

- Teachers more involved : on a measure of teachers' involvement reported by students (e.g. : my teachers care for their students), $\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{C}=+1.3 \mathrm{sd}$.
- Etc.


## The lottery, and estimation strategy

■ Lotteries conducted for 2009 and 2010 admission to Sourdun.
■ Waitlist randomization. Students ordered randomly, available seats offered to first students, some students decline (never takers), seats offered to next student etc.
■ Population: 395 students who participated in lottery. 258 received offer : treatment group. 137 did not : control group.

- In Behaghel et al. (2017), we show that groups balanced on a number of dimensions.
- ITT effects shown thereafter : estimation follows Chaisemartin \& Behaghel (2020).
■ First-stage : $=2.07$ (s.e. $=0.163$ ) : students receiving an offer spend 2.07 more years in Sourdun.


## Data: HS, Bac and HE outcomes

■ We use 2008 to 2017 SYSCA data sets, that contain all secondary school students in France and their outcomes.

- 2008 applicants applied to enter in grade 8, 9, and 10 in 2009 $\Rightarrow$ expected to pass the Bac in 2013 or before.
- 2009 applicants applied to enter in grade 6 through 11 in 2010 $\Rightarrow$ expected to pass the Bac in 2016 or before.
■ We use 2012 to 2018 HE (SIES) data sets, that contain enrollment into, and graduation from, (almost) all HE institutions in France.
■ Using all these data, we can construct main outcome : highest degree obtained, in high school (HS) or higher education (HE).


## Effects on highest degree obtained

## Sourdun $\searrow \mathrm{HS}$ dropout rate, $\nearrow \mathrm{HE}$ graduation rate

Table - Effect of the boarding school on last degree

|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HS or HE ? | 0.270 | -0.142 | 0.049 | 395 |
| HS dropout | 0.207 | -0.079 | 0.044 | 395 |
| Tech or voc HS degree | 0.257 | 0.063 | 0.055 | 395 |
| Non-voc HS degree | 0.267 | 0.158 | 0.056 | 395 |
| Higher Edu (HE) degree |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.045 | -0.027 | 0.022 | 395 |
| HE degrees | 0.104 | 0.125 | 0.040 | 395 |
| Tech or voc HE | 0.060 | 0.038 | 0.028 | 395 |
| Non-selective Univ, STEMEL | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.027 | 395 |
| Non-selective Univ, other field | 0.005 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 395 |
| Selective Grande Ecole | 0.024 | -0.018 | 0.019 | 395 |
| Non-selective Grande Ecole | 1682.747 | 134.981 | 58.686 | 395 |
| Other HE degree |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Predicted wage |  |  |  |  |

## Larger Effects for Minority Students

Panel A : only French spoken at home

|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HE degree | 0.259 | 0.117 | 0.082 | 160 |
| Tech or voc HE | 0.000 | 0.031 | 0.018 | 160 |
| Non-selective univ, STEMEL | 0.069 | 0.134 | 0.056 | 160 |
| Non-selective univ, other field | 0.106 | -0.024 | 0.050 | 160 |
| Selective Grande Ecole | 0.084 | -0.043 | 0.050 | 160 |
| Predicted wage | 1698.348 | 63.039 | 92.039 | 160 |

Panel B : Language other than French spoken at home

|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HE degree | 0.282 | 0.184 | 0.082 | 193 |
| Tech or voc HE | 0.062 | -0.049 | 0.032 | 193 |
| Non-selective univ, STEMEL | 0.135 | 0.113 | 0.068 | 193 |
| Non-selective univ, other field | 0.032 | 0.072 | 0.039 | 193 |
| Selective Grande Ecole | 0.000 | 0.077 | 0.027 | 193 |
| Predicted wage | 1693.139 | 177.668 | 75.155 | 193 |

Comparing majority and minority students

## Minority students come from poorer families.

Table - Socio-demographic characteristics

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Majority | Minority - Majority | SE | N |
| Boy | 0.448 | -0.068 | 0.063 | 353 |
| Parent Blue Collar | 0.323 | 0.222 | 0.063 | 351 |
| Means-tested grant | 0.378 | 0.156 | 0.063 | 351 |
| \# of children in family | 2.523 | 0.682 | 0.205 | 351 |
| Parents divorced | 0.364 | -0.105 | 0.062 | 351 |
| Single parent | 0.394 | -0.057 | 0.060 | 352 |
| Parent completed $\geq \mathrm{HS}$ | 0.497 | -0.194 | 0.066 | 326 |

## Minority students are higher ability

Table - Academic outcomes

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Majority | Minority - Majority | SE | N |
| Grade in French (baseline) | 0.083 | 0.047 | 0.135 | 351 |
| Grade in Maths (baseline) | -0.142 | 0.324 | 0.128 | 351 |
| Peers' grade in French (baseline) | 0.322 | -0.362 | 0.167 | 336 |
| Peers' grade in Maths (baseline) | 0.202 | -0.296 | 0.132 | 336 |

## Minority students are less disruptive and have less friends

Table - Non-cognitive outcomes

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Majority | Minority - Majority | SE | N |
| Behavior score (baseline) | -0.076 | 0.216 | 0.128 | 308 |
| Academic self-esteem (control) | 0.117 | -0.091 | 0.207 | 114 |
| Social self-esteem (control) | 0.375 | -0.523 | 0.267 | 114 |
| General self-esteem (control) | 0.022 | -0.035 | 0.224 | 114 |

## Parents of minority have more ambition for them

Table - Motivation for schooling and ambition

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Majority | Minority - Majority | SE | N |
| Motivation for schooling | -0.295 | 0.161 | 0.246 | 111 |
| HE confidence | 0.242 | -0.357 | 0.284 | 110 |
| HE Knowledge | 0.128 | -0.066 | 0.178 | 110 |
| Parent HE Ambition | -0.348 | 0.526 | 0.257 | 96 |

# In the control group, much better HS outcomes for minorities, not much better HE outcomes. 

|  | Majority | Minority-Majority |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| HS outcomes in control group |  |  |
| No HS degree | 0.310 | -0.124 |
| Non voc HS degree | 0.417 | 0.143 |
| Non voc HS degree, sciences track | 0.161 | 0.190 |
| HE outcomes in control group |  |  |
| Not Enrolled in HE | 0.486 | -0.074 |
| Enrolled at University | 0.320 | -0.016 |
| Enrolled in associate degree | 0.101 | 0.166 |
| Enrolled in prepa | 0.035 | -0.018 |

Heterogeneous effects along the causal chain

## Improvement in studying conditions larger for minority

Table - Effect of boarding school on studying conditions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A : Language other than | French | spoken | at home |  |  |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |  |
| Disruption score | 0.143 | -0.597 | 0.203 | 186 |  |
| Student relation | -0.076 | 0.619 | 0.184 | 149 |  |
| Teacher involvement | -0.145 | 1.044 | 0.191 | 186 |  |
| Relation with teacher | -0.083 | 0.770 | 0.151 | 179 |  |
| Relation with sup | -0.168 | -0.188 | 0.177 | 149 |  |
| Panel B : French spoken at home |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |  |
| Disruption score | 0.095 | -0.553 | 0.244 | 142 |  |
| Student relation | 0.015 | 0.379 | 0.186 | 109 |  |
| Teacher involvement | 0.023 | 0.361 | 0.175 | 143 |  |
| Relation with teacher | -0.094 | 0.416 | 0.212 | 136 |  |
| Relation with sup | -0.240 | -0.241 | 0.214 | 110 |  |

## Improvement in hwk time and test scores $\geq$ for minority

Table - Effect of boarding school on academic outcomes

| Panel A : Language other than French spoken at home |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| Homework hours | 4.647 | 2.424 | 0.768 | 182 |
| Math score (after 2 years) | 0.197 | 0.410 | 0.157 | 186 |
| Panel B : French spoken at home |  |  |  |  |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| Homework hours | 5.190 | 0.259 | 0.659 | 140 |
| Math score (after 2 years) | -0.040 | 0.005 | 0.151 | 145 |

## More positive non-cognitive effects on minority students

Table - Effect of boarding school on non-cognitive outcomes

| Panel A : Language other than French spoken at home |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| Academic self esteem | -0.159 | 0.441 | 0.157 | 185 |
| Social self esteem | -0.394 | 0.468 | 0.212 | 184 |
| General self esteem | -0.211 | 0.430 | 0.207 | 184 |
| Extrinsic motivation | -0.037 | -0.072 | 0.185 | 186 |
| Intrinsic motivation | -0.134 | 0.505 | 0.182 | 186 |
| Amotivation | 0.328 | -0.654 | 0.236 | 186 |
| Panel B : French spoken at home |  |  |  |  |
|  | Control | T-C | SE | N |
| Academic self esteem | -0.079 | -0.134 | 0.232 | 145 |
| Social self esteem | 0.232 | -0.371 | 0.219 | 145 |
| General self esteem | -0.141 | -0.123 | 0.272 | 145 |
| Extrinsic motivation | -0.096 | 0.155 | 0.213 | 144 |
| Intrinsic motivation | -0.295 | 0.484 | 0.203 | 144 |
| Amotivation | -0.010 | 0.212 | 0.194 | 144 |

## Conclusion

## Boarding to better opportunities?

- Results promising : intervention seems to have transformative effects on beneficiaries' trajectories.
- Predicted wage return : $8 \%$ on average, $10.5 \%$ for minority students: TBC with actual wage data.
- Long-run effects much larger than what we could have predicted based on short-term effects (surrogate prediction exercise).
■ Not an early childhood intervention : later interventions can be transformative, too.
■ One of the (the?) first intervention rigorously shown to massively reduce inequalities of opportunities in France.
- Effects concentrated among minority students, the population targeted by policy makers.

Thank you!

